By: Pinaki Bhattacharya (SATP.ORG)
A critical futuristic threat perception vis-à-vis India’s North Eastern
region has long preoccupied many analysts and the Indian security
establishment. The projected exercise would involve Pakistan launching an
attack on Jammu and Kashmir. At the other end, China would engage India
militarily in the latter’s Northeast with movement from Tibet, through
Bhutan and via Alipurduar in the Jalpaiguri district and consequently
cut-off what is referred to as the eastern chicken’s neck or the Shiliguri
corridor. An Indian strategists’ nightmare come true. A possibility that was
touched upon in the recently published novel by a former BBC journalist,
Humphrey Hawksley, called Dragon Fire.
In such a projected war scenario, while India battles Pakistan and China,
behind the lines of the security forces guarding the narrow strip of land
called the Shiliguri corridor, which at its narrowest is 20 kilometres long
and just 20 kilometres wide in the general area south west of Shiliguri, the
United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the Bodos, the Kamtapur Liberation
Organisation and other subversives trained in Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan
raise attrition to a feverish pitch. China could, it is projected, choose to
cut the chicken’s neck with irreversible consequences vis-à-vis India’s
Northeast.
A reasonable assumption of this nature reportedly influenced a group of
senior Indian security officials to meet in May 2000.1 The meeting concluded
that a constant vigil needed to be maintained at the Bagdogra airport in
Jalpaiguri and railway stations like New Jalpaiguri and Coochbehar, as also
at Kishanganj and Katihar in the State of Bihar. Such a constant vigil was
directed towards monitoring the movement of those who are rather quaintly
called ANEs (anti-national elements). The meeting also resolved that a joint
operation of Assam and West Bengal police needs to be launched to flush out
terrorists, besides beefing up the deployment of security forces.
In case such hostilities actually broke out, one of the crucial Chinese
objectives would be to capture a large amount of territory in northern
Sikkim to secure a strategic hold. In tactical terms, this would translate
into denying a launching pad to the Indian forces for an assault on Tibet.
The other element of this thrust, it is projected, would be centred on
capturing areas in Bhutan – the ones traditionally claimed by the Chinese –
thus posing a direct threat to the Shiliguri Corridor, a key item on the
agenda.2
The Shiliguri Corridor3 is an area of 12,203 square kilometers connecting
mainland India with the outlying border States of the Northeast. An
intelligence report of one of security forces operating in the area states:
"As geographical configuration puts the North Eastern States of our country
at a disadvantage for a lack of strategic depth, considered necessary to
provide a buffer, the tenuous lines of communication (that run through this
corridor) connect mainland India to the Northeast." The corridor’s
dimensions extend lengthwise approximately 200 kms with a width varying
between 20 and 60 kilometres. It houses the all-important feeder highways
number NH 31 and 31a and the North Frontier Railways.
During the Sino-Indian war in 1962, a division-strength of troops was moved
in record time from Punjab to Shiliguri in order to protect north Bengal and
Sikkim from the advancing Chinese. The Chinese were pressing ahead of the
Tawang sub-division of what is now known as Arunachal Pradesh, which the
Indian troops had vacated. The Chinese were also found to be amassing troops
across Sikkim. As Pakistan had terminated river traffic through the then
East Pakistan, all supplies for Assam had to be routed through railways from
Katihar in Bihar to Baminigaon via the corridor, where the Brahmaputra river
needed to be crossed by ferry.
The corridor is also significant in light of the vital installations located
around it, like the airfields of Hashimara and Bagdogra, and the oil
pipelines, which run through the corridor. These installations are
considered to be lethal sabotage targets for insurgent groups lurking behind
the lines of defence.
One of the key borders that abut the corridor is with Nepal, stretching 144
kilometres on the other side of north Bengal. Being unmanned, the long
stretch of the border proves immensely conducive for infiltration and also
as a point of egress for ANEs originating in Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan.
Furthermore, the Indo-Nepal Friendship treaty of 1950, which guarantees free
and unhindered movement of Nepalese citizens between the two nations, has
been handy for infiltration exercises. The absence of security forces on the
Indo-Nepal border also attracts agents of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI),
the external intelligence agency of Pakistan, and their co-conspirators to
opt for various clandestine, or even occasionally, regular or open routes in
the area. Of course, in legal terms, while the Nepalese and the Bhutanese
can enter and exit at any point on the border, the other nationals are
required to adopt only an authorised route, which also acts as the trade
route between India and Nepal. In practice, however, there is little to
prevent the ANEs from crossing over at any point, virtually of their choice.
It is only in recent times that the Indian security apparatus has become
aware of the situation on the Indo-Nepal border. According to reports, the
Group of Ministers that scrutinised the Madhav Godbole Committee Report on
border management has recommended that the 1,751-km border be policed by the
paramilitary force, the Special Service Bureau (SSB)4. According to news
reports, the Godbole report critically analysed issues related to
"border-fencing, safeguarding of air space, checking infiltration and
smuggling activities, restructuring of para-military forces guarding the
borders and adoption of modern technology as a force multiplier."5 The
group, headed by the Union Home Minister, L K Advani, has also suggested
that the SSB’s armed wing be brought under the command and control of the
Union Home Ministry to counter smuggling and ISI activities originating in
Nepal.6
According to premier intelligence agencies, the Shiliguri corridor faces
threat not only from this pattern of free movement of personnel and goods
through the border areas, but also from insurgents operating from Bhutan and
particularly in Assam. The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) militants have been using the
corridor for their movement for a long time. The recent emergence of another
insurgent outfit, called the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO),7 in
north Bengal, is adding to the worries of the security forces. Intelligence
reports indicate that, in 1993, certain members of the Rajbongshi community
belonging to the ranks of the All Kamtapur Students’ Union (AKSU) approached
ULFA cadres in the Kokrajhar district of Assam and sought arms training from
them. They were primarily directing their efforts towards organising an
armed struggle for realising their demand of a separate Kamtapur State,
carved out of the districts of north Bengal. Following their contact, 12
Rajbongshi youth were allowed to be trained in a training camp organised by
the ULFA in Bhutan to the north of the trijunction of Bhutan-West
Bengal-Assam. The training could not be completed due to a constant threat
from the security forces and also because certain ULFA cadres had
surrendered.
The Rajbongshi leadership, primarily the AKSU, however, continued their
efforts. They contacted some members of the central leadership of ULFA, who
in turn agreed to train them on the condition that they form a secessionist
outfit. This led to the formation of the KLO. Members of the newly formed
KLO were imparted arms training during 1996-97 in Samdrup Jhankar in Bhutan
where the central headquarters of ULFA is situated.8 The KLO also
established its headquarters near the ULFA HQ at Samdrup Jhankar. The ULFA’s
agenda was to prop up the Rajbongshi militants for its own gains, and the
West Bengal tribals were aiding the outfit to create safe havens in North
Bengal.9 The trained KLO cadres, on their return from Bhutan mingled with
the activists of the Kamtapur Peoples’ Party (KPP) and AKSU, and have been
working with them. An estimated 100 KLO terrorists have received arms
training at the Gelengphu and Kalaikhola camps in Bhutan, and reports also
indicate that the ULFA and KLO had reached an agreement to launch a joint
armed struggle.10 The movement for Kamtapur has thus turned violent with
sporadic incidents of looting, extortion, killings and sabotage. Of late,
the KLO and the ULFA have started an extortion drive targeting the local tea
gardens.11 They are most active in Alipurduar in Jalpaiguri and Shiliguri
sub-division of Darjeeling.
Reports indicate that a large number of KLO cadres have received arms
training at the ULFA camps in neighbouring Bhutan.12 There are also reports
of growing terrorist and subversive activities by the KLO in league with
ULFA militants. Pakistan-trained and ISI-backed ULFA insurgents are reported
to have imparted arms training to three successive batches of KLO
insurgents. Of the three KLO batches, one was trained in a forest in
Jalpaiguri district, while the other two were trained in Bhutan.13 The
arrest of a KLO activist from Matabhanga on May 29, 2001 exposed the
linkages between KLO and ULFA and the training structures in the corridor.14
Earlier, three KLO insurgents arrested from Cooch Behar on December 8, 2000,
confessed to having undergone advanced arms training in the ULFA camp in the
Fifshu jungles of Bhutan.15 According to official sources, they were part of
a 60-strong batch of KLO and ULFA cadre, who had received advanced arms
training between April 15 and July 15, 2000, at ULFA’s Nichula area command
camp.16 In certain instances, KLO militants have been reported to sneak into
Assam after committing violent activities in West Bengal. The ULFA cadres
are reportedly entering the plains of Bengal from the Kumargram village on
the borders of Bengal, Assam and Bangladesh, to train KLO insurgents.17 ULFA
cadres have been using north Bengal as a transit point to go from Bhutan to
Bangladesh and vice versa, while some militants have also crossed over to
Nepal through this area.18 The ULFA militants often visit north Bengal for
medical attention and there are reports that ULFA cadres also use the area
to transport arms and ammunition to their camps in Bhutan.19
The forests on the border of the Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan with West
Bengal also provide ample space for the insurgent groups to operate. The
recent encounter20 between security forces and the Gorkha Liberation
Organisation (GLO), a radical breakaway faction of the Subhash Ghising-led
Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), cadres in the Tinkatari jungles
provides ample testimony of the preparedness of the insurgents in the area,
as also their growing co-ordination with various groups, particularly with
the National Socialist Council of Nagaland –Issak Muivah (NSCN-IM). The
attempted assassination21 of the Gorkha leader, Subhash Ghising, while he
was returning to Darjeeling after a meeting with Union Home Minister Advani
is an indicator of this collusion. The attack is widely believed to be the
handiwork of Chhatre Subba, a one-time Ghising protege who has turned
against the GNLF supremo for his purported betrayal of the Gorkhaland cause.
One of the slain assailants was also identified as an NSCN-IM member. And
the fact that the other team members were reported to have fled to Nepal is
indicative of a broader conspiracy. The NSCN-IM is also allegedly training
certain Gorkha and Nepali youths.22 Two NSCN-IM cadres were killed in an
encounter in the Shamsingh forest in Darjeeling district on November 12,
2000.23 According to intelligence sources in Shiliguri, the NSCN-IM cadres
were part of an instructors’ group that had travelled to West Bengal to
impart arms and explosives handling training to the GLO.
Reports also suggest that the ISI was supplying a large quantity of arms and
ammunition to the various Northeast terrorist outfits from the stockpiles of
the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia after their defeat and eventual obliteration.24
These were picked up from the markets of Thailand and were transported to
Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, eventually to be used on Indian soil. The arms
were shipped from Thai ports to Cox’s Bazaar and were then carried on
headloads for rest of the way.25 The recipients were the NSCN-IM, ULFA and
the Bodo groups.
The NSCN-IM has gradually become the primary militant outfit in the region,
providing training and resources to various other groups. Recently, however,
the Myanmarese authorities initiated a crackdown on the terrorist groups
operating from their soil in the area. Media reports have indicated that an
NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K) camp was attacked by Myanmarese and Indian security
forces in the Konyak region of Myanmar, adjacent to Nagaland.26 Earlier, in
October 2000, a botched operation of the Myanmar Army caused the death of
five Assam Rifles personnel during an encounter with the Khaplang group
cadres.27 Evidently, this mounting pressure has made the NSCN-K amenable to
a cease-fire, which the Indian government offered recently.
Reports indicate that while there are no training camps of the ULFA and NSCN
in Coochbehar and Alipurduar, there are indications that Bodo militants have
their training camps in the adjoining areas at the tri-junction of these two
districts with Bhutan, in the jungles of Kalikhola in that country. The
security forces have arrested certain couriers transporting ration and also
ascertained the frequent movement of Bodo militants along the banks of the
Sankosh river near Kalikhola. Terrorist training camps in Bhutan also exist
in the areas of Goberkundi, south of Udang river, Lungkhavgma, Merungphuc,
Sukhini and Dinsing river. Even though these areas do not abut the
Jalpaiguri district, arrested militants have confessed to having obtained
training in these areas. An ULFA terrorist, Tarani Biasya, arrested in
Alipurduar on February 9, 1998, had confessed to having been trained in
Sukhini. These militants often transport small arms from Bangladesh to
Bhutan through the Shiliguri Corridor on trucks that transport goods to and
from Bangladesh, inducing the truck drivers and owners by threats and money.
Shiliguri town is a gateway to Guwahati in Assam, Gangtok in Sikkim and
Kishengunj in Bihar. It also shares borders with three countries –
Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. The town’s cosmopolitan character, grown out
of it being "an island of prosperity," makes it easier for outsiders to get
assimilated into the local populace, thus providing perfect cover to the
subversives. In fact, the West Bengal government had admitted on the floor
of the State Legislative Assembly in 1999 that the Shiliguri corridor ran
the risk of being sabotaged by ISI agents. This was admitted by the then
Deputy Chief Minister and Minister in-charge for Home, while responding to
the Opposition’s charges following a bomb blast at New Jalpaiguri Station of
north Bengal on June 22, 1999. Some 10 persons, including two Indian Army
personnel bound for Kargil, were killed and more than 80 persons injured in
the incident.28
Security agencies are also concerned at the mushrooming growth of mosques
and madrassas (religious seminaries) in the region. According to their
estimate, in the last five years the total number of madrassas that have
come up in the Shiliguri Corridor area are as follows: Coochbehar – 45,
Jalpaiguri – 44, Shiliguri – 63 and Islampur sub-division, North 5, Dinajpur
– 467. Of these only 23 in Coochbehar are recognized by the West Bengal
government; eight in Jalpaiguri; two in Shiliguri and seven in Islampur.
Yet, the others are flourishing with no dearth of funds. Intelligence
sources suspect that people having linkages with Pakistan-based terrorist
outfits have set up at least some of these mosques and madrassas.
Intelligence reports also state that the Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA)
– renamed as Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen (HuM) – and active in Jammu and Kashmir,
has spread its tentacles in the region, with Nepal and northern West Bengal
as their preferred ground. It is reportedly spreading Muslim fundamentalism
and establishing a string of bases in the Northeast, as also in northern
West Bengal. The HuA is reported to have succeeded in raising a large number
of supporters in the Dangipara area of Shiliguri town, as also in adjoining
areas like Naxalbari, Fulbari, etc.
According to intelligence sources, another organisation called
Tabligh-e-Jamaat is also reported to be active around the Shiliguri
Corridor. They hold regular meetings along Champasari and Bardhaman Road
near Hawra camp in Shiliguri and are also in contact with the
Harkat-ul-Ansar in Nepal. There are also indications of close linkages
between the two groups, with senior members of each attending the meetings
of the other. Although the activity of the organisation is discreet, it
reportedly includes anti-India propaganda, ‘universalisation’ of Islam and
raising funds for ‘Islamic causes.’
Jalpaiguri and Coochbehar districts, which constitute the Coochbehar sector
of the corridor, are bounded by the Bhutan border in the north, starting
from Phuntsholing to Kalikhola tri-junction, and are also contiguous with
410 kilometres of international border with Bangladesh. To the east from
Kalikhola the boundary runs south along the western bank of the Sankosh
River, parallel to Kokrajhar and Dhubri districts in Assam. From the
Bangladesh border, there are three points where the Bhutan border is at a
distance of approximately 60 kilometres. This area not only has NH 31 and NH
31A running through it, but also has broad-gauge and metre-gauge railway
lines passing through before entering Assam. The demographic character of
the area along the Bhutan border comprises Santhals, Bodos, Nepalis and
Rajbongshis. In the Cooch Behar sector live the Bengali Hindus, Rajbongshis,
Bengali and Bihari Muslims. Rajbongshis, Bengali Hindus and Muslims live in
the areas along the Bangladesh border.
The demographic profile within a 5-kilometre belt of the international
border with Bangladesh has undergone rapid changes. According to
intelligence sources, in Jalpaiguri district, while the population of Hindus
and Muslims has been 1,35,938 and 1,63,522 respectively in 1981, in 1991 it
rose to 1,90,805 and 2,35,733 respectively. In Coochbehar, the figure in
1981 was 2,17,588 and 1,41,001 respectively; while in 1991 it was 2,94,038
and 1,85,528 respectively. In the Shiliguri sub-division of Darjeeling
district, the numbers were 48,110 and 71,215, respectively, in 1981; while
in 1991, they were 72,518 and 1,12.302, respectively. In the Islampur and
Raigunj sub-divisions of north Dinajpur, they were 1,78,583 and 2,60,507,
respectively, in 1981; rising to 2,51,472 and 3,41,325, respectively, in
1991.
In early 1999, a media report had indicated that a significant demographic
transformation was occurring around the Corridor, causing serious concern
among security agencies. The report, quoting official sources, pointed out
that, while in 1971 the Muslim population was 15 per cent, in recent years
it has touched a high of 70 per cent in some areas, primarily due to illegal
immigration from Bangladesh. The report referred to the phenomenon of a
large number of Muslim immigrants residing in Islampur of North Dinajpur
district as also Kishangunj of Bihar. The report had also claimed that
untrammelled passage through these areas was available to the thousands of
Bihari Muslims who claim Pakistan’s nationality but remain in Bangladesh
because the former refuses to take them in.29
Given the criticality of threat perceptions, one needs to discern the
reasons for such an apparent laxity in vigil. It is plausible to seek
explanations in the tradition of thin policing of the borders in the area.
Security force levels in the Cooch Behar sector30 consist of four units of
the Border Security Force (BSF) deployed along the 410 km of the
international border, from border post number 814 to 1001; on the
Assam-Bhutan border, a three-company strength of the Central Reserve Police
Force (CRPF) is deployed. The West Bengal Armed Police maintains a platoon
and an Army unit is deployed in Cooch Behar, but is not assigned internal
security duty. SSB companies are also deployed in Tufanganj, Natuarpur and
Hindusthan, and in other areas in the sector. The configuration of
intelligence agencies in the area has the Intelligence Bureau at the apex
followed by the Field Intelligence Units (FIU) of the Army, SSB and the BSF.
Efforts are currently being directed towards seeking a unified effort and
greater co-ordination in operations of the security forces.
One of the key security concerns of the area is gunrunning. According to a
media report, there were two routes through which this lucrative trade was
being conducted. In the first, arms were first sent to certain safe havens
in Shiliguri and later dispatched in small quantities by local couriers who
would typically travel by road or rail. Consignments were then loaded on
Dooars-bound buses heading towards Jaigaon on the Indo-Bhutan border.
Gunrunners also utilise the metre-gauge railway line between Shiliguri and
Alipurduar via Hashimara and Birpara. They are then transferred to hideouts
in the Jayanti hills in the north or Alipurduar in the south.31 The other
preferred route is through the riverine tri-junction in Kishangunj in the
Coochbehar district of West Bengal. The loads are ferried by country boats
at night and later transported in small numbers by local carriers to
Islamabad in Madarihat and Falakata in the Jalpaiguri district.
Another cause for concern for the security apparatus is the growing nexus
between the militant groups and illegal timber traders. Along the Assam-West
Bengal border, timber trading is a lucrative business due its high demand in
West Bengal and in other parts of the country. Various sawmills in the area
north of Bakshirhat in Cooch Behar are reported to be recipients of smuggled
timber, including teak and sesame wood, from Assam. Sawmill owners enjoy the
patronage of terrorist outfits based in Assam, who in turn extort large sums
of money from them in return for security. In their operations, the
militants also utilise various modes of transport like trucks, mini vans and
motorcycles owned by the sawmill owners. Recent developments show that the
Bodo militants, as also the ULFA, have shifted base to the forests of
Bhutan, traversing from their earlier safe houses in Bangladesh. At the
narrowest point in the region, the distance between the Bhutan border and
the Bangladesh border is a mere 60 kilometres. And considering the fact that
the Cooch Behar sector is relatively calm, it is policed lightly.
Furthermore, there are no mobile checkposts in the region to challenge any
movement of suspicious nature.
Intelligence agencies fear that many key installations in the Shiliguri
Corridor are liable to sabotage by militants. Such installations include the
bridge on the national highway near Barovisha in Darjeeling district, the
railway-bridge over river Raidhak, the bridge connecting the national
highway and the railway-bridge over Sankosh River.
Before 1947, the North Eastern States, especially Assam, were connected with
the mainland through waterways, road and railway networks running through
what was then a part of the Bengal Presidency and later named East Pakistan
and, eventually, Bangladesh. Thus, linkages between that country and the
Assamese were deep, and these, the ISI later sought to exploit. In fact, a
Foreign Service officer of Bangladesh, Mohammad Siddique, has claimed that
"India had received the corridor at Shiliguri, though Bangladesh (i.e. the
then East Pakistan) had more claims over the territory because of population
characteristics."32
Such a mindset has created worries in the security establishment, and these
were articulated by the former Director of the Intelligence Bureau and
former Governor of West Bengal, T V Rajeshwar: "It is not Kashmir alone
which should cause anxiety. The Bangladeshi infiltration, which continues
unabated, has changed the demographic pattern of eastern India. There is a
grave danger to the Shiliguri Corridor, which is the lifeline of the seven
North Eastern states and Sikkim, because of the concentration of the
Bangladeshi migrants there. Bengal’s premier in 1946, Nizamuddin, wrote to
Governor R.G. Casey that Bengal would soon become a Muslim majority province
if left undisturbed. Even if his dream was belied because of the Partition,
Dr. Henry Kissinger’s foreboding of a Muslim majority state emerging from
within Indian borders is there to contend with."33
Thus, it is evident that the Shiliguri Corridor faces major threats in its
geographical vicinity from the overbearing Chinese presence as also from
relatively minor neighbours like Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. Furthermore,
the overarching consideration in the security framework is the ability of
Pakistan to subvert the regimes in these countries and consequently increase
insurgent pressures in the area.
Since the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the architect of
Bangladesh and its first Premier, every regime in that country has fostered
anti-Indian forces within its territorial ambit. Indeed, Begum Khaleda Zia,
the current Premier, had gone to the extent of calling the Northeast
insurgents, "freedom fighters."34 The crucial leverage that Bangladesh has
gained in its endeavour to create instability in India at a low cost is the
large number of its own people residing on Indian soil. The Bangladeshis
have a novel way of ‘legalising’ their immigration in India. The relatives
who are in India reportedly get the names of those across the border
included in the voters’ list during enumeration. As their names finally
appear in the list, messages are then sent across to them to finally cross
over. It is this population that reportedly creates a buffer of
non-combatants for the militants and they utilise them as perfect cover.
Even though an Indian protectorate, the Royal Kingdom of Bhutan has, in the
recent past, played host to ULFA and Bodo militants, who have found a
comfortable habitat in the southern part of the country. In fact, some
reports claim that captured ULFA cadres have vouched to witnessing three
visits by the King of Bhutan to their camps. However, recent reports reveal
that the Bhutanese government has commenced fortification of its borders
with Assam, ostensibly to deter the free passage of militants. They have
reportedly deployed 3,000 troops on the border and are planning to put more
forces on the ground.35 But the King and the government indicate marked
reluctance to engage the militants on the grounds that "We are not sure of
the kind of support these militant groups enjoy in Assam and in case there
is an armed conflict between the Bhutanese security forces and the
militants, it would have a major impact on the country’s economy and its
age-old relations between the people of Bhutan and Assam would be seriously
affected. It may take many years before the relations normalised."36
Certain analysts perceive eastern Nepal, bordering the Shiliguri Corridor,
to be the springboard for Pakistan-sponsored insurgency in the Northeast.
Nepal’s proximity to this passage assumes significance because of its
strategic importance. Bound by Nepal and Bangladesh in the south, the use of
this passage for transferring small arms and contraband from both the
countries is now well established.37
The fact that Nepal has been open to subversion by ISI operatives is also
beyond dispute. Yakoob Memon, one of the accused in the 1993 Mumbai blast
case, was traced in Nepal,38 and then the infamous IC-814 hijacking had its
origins at the Tribhuvan International Airport, causing substantial damage
to bilateral relations between India and Nepal, which took some effort in
mending. But the fact that the Nepalese are not adopting a laid-back
attitude about taking actions against those who are using their territory
for launching anti-India campaigns is evident in the recent arrest and
incarceration of a senior Pakistani diplomat, who was found in possession of
large quantities of explosives.39
In 1962, when the Chinese had begun their troop concentration across the
border, Indian security planners were rightly worried about the possible
threat to eastern India. This had led to a decision to withdraw troops from
the Punjab border with Pakistan and mass them in Shiliguri focusing on the
area of the Corridor. This was a difficult decision to make because
intelligence agencies were suspicious of General Ayub Khan’s intentions.
Yet, the then Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna Menon, had obtained the
necessary clearance from the then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to move
troops from the Northwest to the East.40
One may take note that the Kamtapur Peoples’ Party (KPP), which contested
the recent elections to the State Legislative Assembly in West Bengal, had
failed to secure a significant mandate. Receiving an average of seven per
cent of the total votes polled, the KPP has been humbled in vast tracts of
North Bengal, which it wants to be a part of their ‘new State’ of Kamtapur.
But now that they have failed to secure democratic sanction for themselves
that could have validated their demand by providing numerical muscle, what
will the party’s next agenda be? There exists a sense of collective denial
about the existence of any insurgent action committed by anyone attached to
the movement for a separate Kamtapur.41 Almost to a man, the KPP leadership
has refused to acknowledge the existence of the KLO, even as the security
agencies were equally insistent about its threatening presence.
In the light of these developments, it is imperative to critically
scrutinise the significance of the Shiliguri Corridor and to initiate steps
to render it safe in the larger interest of maintaining the sovereign
security and integrity of the region as also of the nation.
ENDNOTES
1. The meeting took place in Assam. Source: Intelligence reports.
2. "Evaluation of the Chinese Threat", See www.indiavotes.com/columns1/2001feb2-tksludra.html
3. The corridor comprises Islampur sub-division of Darjeeling district,
Jalpaiguri Sadar and Alipurduar sub-divisions of Jalpaiguri district and
Toofanganj, Mathabhanga, Coochbehar Sadar, Dinhata and Mekhliganj
sub-divisions of Coochbehar district.
4. Based on the report of the Kargil Review Committee chaired by K
Subrahmanyam, the then Convenor of the National Security Advisory Board,
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee constituted a Group of Cabinet Ministers
(GoM) in April 2000 to review the national security system and to formulate
specific proposals for implementation. The GoM set up four task forces, one
each for intelligence apparatus, border management, internal security and
management of defence. Madhav Godbole, a former Home Secretary, headed the
task force on border management. He submitted a 499-page report to the GoM,
headed by Union Home Minister L.K. Advani.
5. See "Ministerial group gets report on border management",
www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/20000830/ina30040.html; The Godbole report
recommended that paramilitary forces such as the Border Security Force, the
Indo-Tibetan Border Police and Assam Rifles should man international
borders, but operate directly under the army in cases where the boundary
line is unsettled or under dispute.
6. The Telegraph, Kolkata, December 11, 2000
7. The Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) was formed in 1995 by the
Koch-Rajbongshi tribes to carve out a separate Kamatapur State, comprising
six north Bengal districts and Goalpara district in lower Assam through an
armed struggle. For a profile of the KLO, see South Asia Terrorism Portal;
India; Terrorist Groups; Assam; KLO; www.satp.org
8. "WB separatists woo Assam tribals" www.northeastvigil.com/newsarch/01121999i.htm
9. Ibid. The decision to prop up Rajbongshi rebel outfits was taken by the
ULFA in December 1995 at the initiative of Raju Baruah, a senior leader of
the ULFA's military wing. Subsequently, the ULFA entrusted the then chairman
of its Darrang district unit, Ajit Kachari, with the task of setting up the
Koch-Rajbongshi Liberation Organisation (KRLO) in Lower Assam.
Simultaneously, the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) was formed in
North Bengal following a meeting at Kumargram. The first batch of 25 KRLO
members went to the ULFA camps in Bhutan for training in December 1995.
10. "India: ULFA, KLO to launch joint movement in Assam". Both the outfits
also decided to indulge in joint extortion drives in Assam. This decision
was taken at a meeting in Bhutan in July 2001. www.satp.org/news/2001/August/news23.htm
11. "India: North Bengal turning into hotbed of militancy", www.satp.org/news/November/news%2014.htm#8
12. See South Asia Terrorism Portal ; India; Terrorist Groups; Assam; KLO;
www.satp.org
13. "West Bengal seeks more forces" www.rediff.com/news/1999/dec/09wb.htm
14. "Kamtapur-Ne Nexus Uncovered", www.telegraphindia.com/archive/1010531/national.htm#head2
15. "Ominous Kamtapur Nexus Unearthed", www.telegraphindia.com/archive/1001210/front_pa.htm#head2
16. Ibid. Nichula base is adjacent to Kalikhola on the Indo-Bhutan border
north of Uttar Haldibari. The camp, reportedly, is approximately 8 km north
of Allay bust, the last Bhutanese border village, inside the Fifshu jungle.
17. "Separatist movement in North Bengal gets Ulfa help",
www.news.india-today.com/ntoday/newsarchives/100/12/10/n133.shtml
18. "Bengal CM cautions against ultras", www.rediff.com/news/2000/dec/04ne.htm
19. Ibid.
20. Two suspected militants were killed in an encounter with police at
Tinkatari near Samshing, close to the Bhutan border on November 12, 2000.
Those killed were reportedly cadres of the Gorkha Liberation Organisation.
One security force personnel was killed and another injured during the
encounter. See "Naga ultras killed in shootout", Statesman, Kolkata,
November 13, 2000.
21. On February 9, 2001, militants armed with sophisticated rifles and
grenades attacked Ghising’s convoy bound for Darjeeling from Shiliguri on a
narrow and winding mountain road. See "Thunder in the hills", Hindu,
Chennai, February 18, 2001. Subba was arrested on March 23, 2001 near the
Indo-Nepal border.
22. "Stealthily, a rebel Gorkha group builds a base", http://news.india-today.com/ntoday/newsarchives/100/11/28/n52.shtml.
23. "Bengal CM cautions against ultras", www.rediff.com/news/2000/dec/04ne.htm
24. "Ultra Getting Arms from Khmer Rouge",
http://piglet.uccs.edu/~kalita/assam/news/1997/1997-11-25.html, See also
"ISI training outfits in camps across Bangladesh",
www.northeastvigil.com/newsarch/16052000i.htm#i06
25. See South Asia Terrorism Portal; India; Assessment; www.satp.org
26. Times of India, New Delhi, May 19, 2001.
27. Indiainfo.com, October 26, 2000.
28. Pioneer, New Delhi, June 23, 1999. Also see "The Islamization of West
Bengal",
www.swordoftruth.com/swordoftruth/archives/byauthor/dhruvajyotibarua/
tiowb.html
29. Times of India, February 15, 1999.
30. Intelligence sources.
31. Telegraph, December 13, 2000.
32. "Kathmandu Revisited", People’s Review, Kathmandu, August 7, 1997.
33. T.V Rajeshwar, "The Lessons of Kosovo", Hindu, May 5, 1999.
34. Sreeradha Dutta, Security of India’s Northeast: External Linkages",
Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, November 2000, Vol. XXIV No. 8, p. 1506.
35. Times of India, May 19, 2001.
36. Times of India, April 16, 2001.
37. Hindu, September 8, 1999.
38. Dutta, "Security of India’s Northeast", p. 1506.
39. Police in Kathmandu arrested a senior Pakistani diplomat Mohammad Arshad
with 16 kg of RDX on April 12, 2001. According to official sources, the
arrested diplomat, the first secretary in the Pakistani Embassy, was due to
return to his country after a posting in Nepal. See
www.satp.org/satporgtp/detailsmall_news.asp?date1=4/13/2001&id=7
40. B.N. Mullik, The Chinese Betrayal, Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971, p.
382.
41. This was made evident during the writer’s visit to the region.